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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-JUDICIAL DETERMINATION THAT
GRANDPARENTS WOULD BEST SERVE INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
SUPPORTS AWARD OF CUSTODY TO GRANDPARENTS RATHER
THAN FATHER. Painter v. Bannister (Iowa 1966).
Following the accidental death of his wife in 1963, Painter placed
his five-year-old son in the temporary custody of the boy's maternal
grandparents. Upon their refusal two years later to return the boy;
Painter brought habeas corpus proceedings and was awarded custody
of his son by the trial court. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Iowa,
held, reversed: Painter, although a fit parent, could not offer his son
the security and stability necessary to assure the child's best interests.
Painter v. Bannister, -Iowa-, 140 N.W.2d 152 (1966), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966).1
In awarding custody to the grandparents, the Iowa Supreme Court
adhered to the well established principle that in custody actions,
primary consideration must be given to the best interests of the child.2
More significantly, the court applied the principle in such a way that
the boy's best interests were determined by comparing the relative
advantages to be gained by awarding custody of the child to Painter,
an admittedly fit father, as against an award to the fit grandparents.3
While a comparative fitness test has frequently been applied in Iowa
decisions to deprive fit parents of the custody of their children, the
test does not appear to have been uniformly applied.'
1 The questions presented to the Supreme Court in Painter's unsuccessful petition
for certiorari were:
(1) Does Fourteenth Amendment bar state from depriving parent of custody
of his child and awarding such custody to others, so long as parent is fit and
qualified and has not abandoned child? (2) If state in any circumstances may
deprive such parent of custody, may it do so, consistently with First Amend-
ment and Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, on basis of parent's
political and religious beliefs or on basis of no evidence other than testimony
of psychologist who had never professionally seen parent or his household
and who was retained by persons contesting parent's claim of custody? 35
U.S.L. WEEK (U.S. Oct. 18, 1966) (No. 518).
2 "It is universally recognized by all courts that, in fixing the custody of a child,
considerations of the welfare and interests of the child outweigh all other considera-
tions .... " Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 432 (1951). See discussion of terms, note 9 infra;
Carrere v. Prunty, - Iowa -, 133 N.W.2d 692 (1965); Vanden Heuvel v. Vanden
Heuvel, 254 Iowa 1391, 121 N.W.2d 216 (1963); Finken v. Porter, 246 Iowa 1345,
72 N.W.2d 445 (1955); Lursen v. Henrichs, 239 Iowa 1009, 33 N.W.2d 383 (1948).
8 "We are not confronted with a situation where one of the contesting parties is not
a fit or proper person. There is no criticism of either the Bannisters or their home.
There is no suggestion in the record that Mr. Painter is morally unfit." - Iowa --
140 N.W.2d at 154.
4 In Finken v. Porter, 246 Iowa 1345, 72 N.W.2d 445 (1955), a comparative fit-
ness test was applied. Dissenting from the majority opinion, Justice Hays pointed to
the principle previously expressed by the Iowa Supreme Court in Watters v. Watters,
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Perhaps the most startling aspect of the case was the court's con-
sideration of Painter's religious and political beliefs, as well as his
unconventional attitudes and tastes,5 as factors in determining
whether or not he was entitled to custody of his son. Journalists have
focused much of their indignation on the court's contention that a
conventional, middle-class home is more conducive to security than an
"arty, bohemian" one, and the related assumption that security is a
more valuable commodity than intellectual stimulation.6 While these
assertions are certainly open to question, a decision based upon such
beliefs constitutes no judicial novelty7 and was well within the court's
discretion. Of more legitimate concern to the legal community was the
introduction into the deliberations of the court of matters dealing
with constitutionally protected freedoms of individual conscience and
belief.8
While these aspects of Painter v. Bannister have subjected the de-
243 Iowa 741, 744, 53 N.W.2d 162, 163 (1952), that "the unfitness which deprives
a parent of the right to the custody of a child must be positive, and not merely com-
parative." The principle cited was, however, only a partial and apparently misleading
quotation from 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 12 (1950) at 659, for, on the same page,
it is stated that "there may be other considerations superseding the parents' fitness and
competence."
5 - Iowa at - - -- 140 N.W.2d at 154-56. Painter was characterized as "either
an agnostic or atheist" and as "a political liberal." Comparison was also made of the
Bannister's "stable, dependable, conventional, middle-class, middlewest background" as
against Painter's "Bohemian approach to finances and life in general." The court con-
cluded that while the boy's life with his father would "be more exciting and challeng-
ing in many respects," nevertheless "security and stability in the home are more im-
portant than intellectual stimulation in the proper development of a child."
6 "So the corn-fed voice of justice . ..
"And for these reasons, and in such terms, a man is denied his own son!
"In Iowa, I suppose, such yokel justice wears a halo-or is that just hayseed caught
in the judicial hair?
"And still the ruling remains an infamous distortion of natural right, infamously
based on a clod-hopping self-righteousness so smug that contempt of court is not a
sufficient response to it, and even derision is only a beginning. The court in its fat-
headed apotheosis of the yokel has cited wantonly provincial reasons for denying one
of the most natural ties known to man. It is not enough to cite the court for incom-
petence. It has been nothing less than sinfully self-laudatory of its own barren mores."
Ciardi, Saturday Review, p. 26, 44, March 26, 1966. The extent to which courts should
reflect the prevailing mores of their communities is a separate question, not dealt with
here.
7 Carrick v. Stoddard, 250 Iowa 1181, 1185, 98 N.W.2d 315, 318 (1959) ("The
record shows the Stoddards are a religious and wholesome young couple.") ; Stevenson
v. MvcMillan, 250 Iowa 737, 741, 95 N.W.2d 719, 722 (1959) (peculiarity as to food
matters element in denying custody to father).
8 See material cited note 1 supra; 43 ACLU FORUM, No. 10, at 8 (Oct. 1966)
("The national office of the ACLU has decided to file an amicus curiae [brief] after first
concluding that there was no civil liberties issue at stake."); see generally, Annot., 66
A.L.R.2d 1410 (1959).
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cision to considerable criticism and commentary, the underlying and
determining omparative fitness doctrine, together with the best-
interests-of-the-child rule, have received little attention and remain
the virtually unchallenged law in many jurisdictions. 9 Perhaps the
Painter decision will attain its ultimate legal and social value by
inducing legislative and judicial reconsideration of these widely ac-
cepted doctrines.
In contrast to the prevailing trend, the California Supreme Court
has consistently enunciated the principle that "[I]f either of the
parents is a fit and proper person to have custody of a child, a
stranger may not usurp that right.""' The primary significance and
difficulty of these decisions rests, however, on the California Supreme
Court's interpretation of the California codes respecting custody ac-
tions, rather than on any notable differences in California statutory
law. Both Iowa and California law entertain rebuttable presumptions
of parental preference' and both subscribe to the best-interests-of-
the-child principle.' The main difference seems, at first glance, to lie
9 See, e.g., Root v. Allen, 151 Colo. 1311, 377 P.2d 117 (1962); Thumma v. Hart-
sook, 239 Md. 38, 210 A.2d 151 (1965); Mitchell v. Powell, 253 Miss. 867, 179 So.
2d 811 (1965); Com. ex rel. Ruczynski v. Powers, 206 Pa. Super. 415, 212 A.2d 922
(1965); Scozzari v. Curtis, 398 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. 1966). But see Application of Mit-
tenhal, 37 Misc. 2d 502, 235 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Faro. Ct. 1962). Although it would ap-
pear to be the adjective best which compels courts to resort to a comparative fitness
test to determine where a child's best interests lie, the terms welfare, best welfare, in-
terests and best interests are, in practice, often used interchangeably. It is probably safe
to assume, then, that in a jurisdiction which awards custody on the basis of a com-
parison among fit claimants, the best interests rule prevails, regardless of whether or
not the adjective is employed in every instance.
10 Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal. 2d 141, 143, 152 P.2d 999, 1000 (1944); accord,
Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 P.2d 888 (1954); Stewart v. Stewart, 41
Cal. 2d 447, 260 P.2d 44 (1953); Stever v. Stever, 6 Cal. 2d 166, 56 P.2d 1229
(1936); Marlow v. Wene, 240 Cal. App. 2d 746, 49 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966); Guard-
ianship of Clark, 217 Cal. App. 2d 808, 32 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1963); Guardianship of
Wisdom, 146 Cal. App. 2d 635, 304 P.2d 221 (1956) ; see discussion of other juris-
dictions with similar holdings, note 40 infra.
11 Painter v. Bannister, - Iowa at -, 140 N.W.2d at 156 ("[There is the pre-
sumption of parental preference, which though weakened in the past several years,
exists by statute.") ; CODE oF IOWA § 668.1 ("Parents are the natural guardians of the
persons of their minor children ... :'); accord, Carrere v. Pnmty, - Iowa -, 133
N.W.2d 692 (1965). CAL. PROB. CODE § 1407 ("Of persons equally entitled in other
respects to guardianship of a minor, preference is to be given as follows: 1. to a parent
."); see cases cited note 10 supra.
12 Childers v. Childres, - Iowa -, 136 N.W.2d 268 (1965); Finken v. Porter,
246 Iowa 1345, 72 N.W.2d 445 (1955); CAL. PROB. CODE § 1406 ("In appointing a
general guardian of a minor, the court is to be guided by what appears to be for the
best interests of the child in respect to its temporal and mental and moral welfare
.... "); accord, Guardianship of Newell, 187 Cal. App. 2d 425, 10 Cal. Rptr. 29
(1960).
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merely in the relatively greater weight accorded the parental prefer-
ence presumption in California."3 In Guardianship of Smith,' 4 for ex-
ample, Justice Carter states that "it has been held repeatedly that,
while the best interests of [a] .. .child is the important factor, the
parents of such child have a superior claim as against the world to
his custody if they are fit and proper."'r5 Such a statement incorporates
the identical elements of fitness, parental right, and the child's best
interests relied upon repeatedly in Iowa case law,' 6 as well as most
other jurisdictions.' Yet, in California, a fit parent invariably pre-
vails over strangers,' 8 while under Iowa law, the rights of even fit
parents must "yield readily to ... the best interests of the children."' 9
The majority of courts have had little difficulty in juggling the
terms fit, suitable, and proper,20 together with the concepts of the
natural or superior rights of parents, to arrive at a presumption of
parental preference. 21 This presumption may be more or less readily
overcome by a showing that the parent is not, in fact, best suited to
assure his child's best interests.22 California, on the other hand, has
Is In California, the presumption of parental fitness (see Guardianship of Rose, 171
Cal. App. 2d 677, 340 P.2d 1045 (1959)), together with the requirement that fit parents
be preferred over strangers (see cases cited note 10 supra), necessarily results in a par-
ticularly strong parental preference presumption.
14 255 P.2d 761 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 P.2d 888
(1954).
:5 Id. at 762.
16 See, e.g., Vanden Heuvel v. Vanden Heuvel, 254 Iowa 1391, 121 N.W.2d 216
(1963) ; Finken v. Porter, 246 Iowa 1345, 72 N.W.2d 445 (1955).
17 E.g., Wilson v. Mitchell, 406 P.2d 4 (Alaska 1965); Setser v. Caldwell, 300 Ky.
356, 188 S.W.2d 451 (1945); State ex rel. Lott v. Courtney, 248 La. 466, 178 So. 2d
489 (1965); Mitchell v. Powell, 253 Miss. 867, 179 So. 2d 811 (1965); Boucher v.
Dittmer, 151 Neb. 580, 38 N.W.2d 401 (1949); People ex rel. Anonymous v. Talbot
Perkins Adoption Service, 46 Misc. 2d 369, 259 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1965); Scozzari v.
Curtis, 398 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. 1966).
18 See cases cited note 10 snpra.
'9 Thein v. Squires, 250 Iowa 1149, 1157, 97 N.W.2d 156, 162 (1959); accord,
Carrere v. Prunty, - Iowa -, 133 N.W.2d 692 (1965); see cases cited note 16 supra.
20 While the terms fit, suitable and proper are sometimes equated by the courts, the
concept of a suitable parent is often distinguished from the other two as encompassing
a wider range of elements. State ex rel. Tuttle v. Hanson, 274 Wis. 42, 80 N.W.2d
387 (1957). Fitness, in most jurisdictions, is determined by the trial court and rarely
indicates more than that a parent is not grossly incompetent or immoral. See 67 C.J.S.
Parent and Child § 12 (1950) at 659.
21 See, e.g., In the Matter of Ramelow, 3 Ill. App. 2d 190, 121 N.E.2d 41 (1954);
Roaden v. Roaden, 394 S.W.2d 754 (Ky. 1965); State ex rel. Lott v. Courtney, 248 La.
466, 178 So. 2d 489 (1965) ; Vollbrecht v. Vollbrecht, 178 Neb. 31, 131 N.W.2d 651
(1964); People ex rel. Anonymous v. Talbot Perkins Adoption Service, 46 Misc. 2d
369, 259 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1965); McKay v. Mitzel, 137 N.W.2d 792 (N.D. 1965);
In re Cooper, 17 Utah 296, 410 P.2d 475 (1966).
22 See, e.g., McReynolds v. Hughes, 398 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. 1966); McKay v. Mitzel,
137 N.W.2d 792 (N.D. 1965) ; Whitman v. Whitman, 28 Wis. 50, 135 N.W.2d 835
(1965).
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interrelated the same concepts in such a way that only abandon-
mentm or judicially determined unfitness 24 have been held sufficient
to rebut the presumption. The reason for these paradoxically dis-
similar holdings is not difficult to ascertain-a meaningful applica-
tion of the principle of superior parental rights is, in practice, incom-
patible with any true adherence to the doctrine that a child's best
welfare must be the paramount consideration.2 5 Since neither principle
has, for historical reasons, been abandoned by most courts, a prefer-
ence for one has necessarily entailed a corresponding adulteration or
weakening of the other. In the majority of jurisdictions it has been
parental rights which have been sacrificed, although these rights are
almost universally recognized to exist.26 It may not be so remarkable,
then, that in stressing parental rights, California has, at least nom-
inally, retained the best-interests-of-the-child test, while declining to
apply the necessary corollary to that test-a comparison among claim-
ants to determine which will best serve those interests.2 7
While both Iowa and California decisions are, in a sense, equally
the victims of these conflicting principles, the California position is
more difficult to maintain. Although Iowa courts have almost fatally
weakened the concept of superior parental rights by subordinating
these rights, in every case, to a child's best interests,28 the decisions
23 Guardianship of Rutherford, 188 Cal. App. 2d 202, 10 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1961);
CAL. PROB. CODE § 1409 ("A parent who knowingly or willfully abandons, or, having
the ability so to do, fails to maintain his minor child . . . forfeits all right to the
guardianship of such child. ... )
24 Guardianship of Wisdom, 146 Cal. App. 2d 635, 304 P.2d 221 (1956) (parent en-
titled to preference over all others in absence of finding of unfitness or incompetency);
accord, cases cited note 10 supra.
25 If a parent's superior right to custody is conditioned on his ability to match the
advantages offered his child by all contending strangers (although mere financial supe-
riority is generally discounted), this right seems tenuous, at best. If, on the other hand,
his superior rights are enforced by automatically awarding him custody as against
strangers unless he is proven grossly incompetent (see material cited note 39 infra),
consideration of his child's best interests can hardly have been paramount.
26 E.g., Stubbs v. Hammond, - Iowa -, 135 N.W.2d 540 (1965) (parental right
inherent, constitutionally protected); State ex rel. Lott v. Courtney, 248 La. 466, 178
So. 2d 489 (1965) (if rights, best interest conflict, best interests prevail) ; Vollbrecht
v. Vollbrecht, 178 Neb. 31, 131 N.W.2d 651 (1964); Com. ex rel. Ruczynski v. Pow-
ers, 206 Pa. Super. 415, 212 A.2d 922 (1965) (prima facie right of mother must yield
to child's best interest); Scozzari v. Curtis, 398 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. 1966) (parental
right must yield to child's best interests).
27 See cases cited note 10 supra. In Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal. 2d 141, 144, 152 P.2d
999, 1000 (1944), the California Supreme Court cites with approval the opinion of
In re White, 54 Cal. App. 2d 637, 640, 129 P.2d 706, 708 (1942) ("The right of a
parent to the care and custody of a child cannot be taken away merely because the court
may believe that some third person can give the child better care and greater protec-
tion.").
28 See cases cited note 2 supra.
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represent little more than the court's choice of priorities-strict ad-
herence to one principle, mere lip service to the other. The California
Supreme Court, on the other hand, has committed itself to the un-
tenable proposition that a fit parent is necessarily, or perhaps by defi-
nition, best able to assure his child's welfare.2 9 The difficulties en-
tailed in assuming such a stance are twofold: (1) The decisions,
presumably based on statutory law, do not appear to conform with
legislative intent;30 and (2) to predicate that a fit parent is, ipso
facto, the best possible guardian for his child begs the question and
makes a factual determination of who can best subserve the child's
interests impossible.3 1
If, then, Iowa's stress on the best-interests-of-the-child rule tends to
emasculate the parental rights doctrine, and California's commitment
to parental rights makes its presumed application of the best interests
test meaningless, it becomes necessary to ask: (1) Why have both
principles, at least nominally, been retained by most jurisdictions?
and (2) Does only one of the two principles deserve to survive, or is
a workable compromise possible and desirable?
The policies underlying a court's authority as parens patriae reach
back to ancient times3 2 and appear basically sound-to guard minors
and to preserve the state.3 At common law, however, parental rights
29 In Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal. 2d 141, 152 P.2d 999 (1944), the court based its
opinion, in part, on the provisions of Calif. Prob. Code section 1407, which gives first
preference to parents among persons "equally entitled in other respects to the guardian-
ship of a minor ...." By construing equal entitlement as the equivalent of fitness, the
court concludes that a fit parent must always be preferred over strangers. To permit this
conclusion to conform with the best interests requirement of Calif. Prob. Code section
1406, the court apparently determined that if fit parents were to be preferred, the justi-
fication for this preference must lie in their superior ability to serve their children's
best interests. In Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 95, 265 P.2d 888, 891 (1954),
Justice Traynor, in concurring, argued that "it would seem inherent in the very concept
of a fit parent that such a parent would be at least as responsive as the trial court, and
very probably more so, to the best interests of the child."
30 In In re Smith's Guardianship, 147 Cal. App. 2d 686, 692, 306 P.2d 86, 91
(1956), the District Court of Appeal dearly manifested its dissatisfaction with the
California Supreme Court's reasoning by-pointing out that
A literal reading of these sections [see discussion and citations note 29 supra]
would tend to indicate that it was the legislative intent that the best interests
of the child should be the controlling factor, and that the right of the parent
to be appointed only comes into existence when the parent is "equally entitled"
to the guardianship with the contending person. But the cases have not so
held. They have held that the best interests of the child require that the par.
ent be its guardian unless that parent is unfit.
31 See discussion note 29 supra; see generally, Comment, 33 CALIF. L. Rnv. 306
(1945).
32 Lippincott v. Lippincott, 97 NJ. Eq. 517, 128 Atl. 254 (1925) (authority of
state to protect and control infants is fundamental and was exercised in ancient Greece,
Egypt and Persia).
33 Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 926, 41 N.W.2d 60 (1950).
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were supreme, and the court's authority was essentially restricted to
protecting children from gross abuse.84 With the emergence of a
more enlightened recognition of the rights of children as individuals,
the common law view that parental rights to the custody of their
children represented mere extensions of their property rights85 fell
into disrepute. Although belief in the importance of preserving the
natural family unit seems too deeply engrained in tradition to have
been discarded altogether, most modern jurisdictions have never-
theless been reluctant to espouse the rights of parents too vigorously.
This reluctance, and the corresponding development of the principle
that a child's best interests must be paramount, seem, from the lan-
guage of courts and legal commentators alike,86 to be explainable, in
large part, as vehement and outraged reactions to the earlier child-
as-chattel theory. Consequently, exclusive focusing on the undesir-
ability of regarding children as property has tended to result in an
uncritical acceptance of the best-interests-of-the-child rule as the
single alternative to the common law view. 7 It is at least questionable,
however, whether a child who happens to be the subject of a custody
action need be guaranteed best interests protection-a far higher
standard of welfare than is accorded other children.8 Furthermore,
34 See 2 TIFFANY, PERSONS AND DOMESTiC RELATIONS 343-44 (3d ed. 1921).
35 Campbell v. Wright, 130 Cal. 380, 382, 62 Pac. 613, 614 (1900).
[I]t is a mistake to suppose that the right of the father is merely fiduciary.
It is that; but it is also-like the right of the child in the father---a right
vested in him for his own benefit, and of which it would be a personal injury
to deprive him. The right must therefore be regarded as coming within the
reason, if not within the strict letter, of the constitutional provisions for the
protection of property.
36 Justice Schauer, dissenting from the majority opinion in In re Kentera's Guardian-
ship, 41 Cal. 2d 639, 645, 262 P.2d 317, 321 (1953), charges that "Again, this court
places reliance upon and follows the dark view that as against parents a child is a mere
chattel." See Kenner v. Kenner, 139 Tenn. 211, 221, 201 S.W. 779, 782 (1918) (The
"dominant thought ... that children are not chattels, but intelligent and moral beings,
and that as such their welfare and their happiness is a matter of first consideration...
[expresses] elevated and humane sentiments [which] must find response in the bosom
of every right-thinking man.").
87 Professor Sayre of the State University of Iowa, less than enchanted with the rule,
writes: "Courts and legal writers alike seem so pleased with themselves in hitting on
the best-interests-of-the-child test, that they are both unable and unwilling to think of
anything else." Referring to a leading opinion which upholds the doctrine, Prof. Sayre
continues: "With evident relish, the court repudiated the former rule which affirmed
the parent's primary right to custody, and, having rejected this, luxuriated in the solemn
self-righteousness of applying the best-interests-of-the-child test against all comers."
Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 672, 678-79 (1941-42). It
should be noted, however, that while Professor Sayre objects to the "partiality" of the
test and recommends that the interests of parents, as well as those of the child, be taken
into account, his criticism appears to stem more from a conviction that "such a test
will in fact injure the child" than from concern with parental rights per se. Id. at 681.
38 Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 95, 265 P.2d 888, 891 (1954) (concurring
opinion).
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parental rights need not be predicated on a property theory. The
proposition that parents may have defensible moral and legal rights
to the companionship and rearing of their children is quite distinct
from the chattel theory and is entitled to evaluation on its own merits.
If such a principle of parental rights is to be given serious effect,
however, it appears very nearly inevitable that some rule of law much
like California's would need to be applied. To remedy the two funda-
mental flaws inherent in the California position, it would be necessary
to: (1) broaden the concept of unfitness to encompass elements
beyond gross incompetence, neglect or abuse"9 (e.g., evident lack of
parental affection or concern, degree of justification for initial separa-
tion from child); and (2) eliminate the best interests test and sub-
stitute for it a basic or primary standard of welfare comparable to
that which the ordinary parent is required to maintain for his child.
By applying a reasonable fitness test, broadly outlined to permit the
exercise of judicial discretion, courts could safeguard the basic wel-
fare of children as well as the rights of parents without resort to the
inflexible best interests standard adhered to in most jurisdictions.
Such a test would, moreover, eliminate the need to subject presumably
fit parents to the further burden of establishing that their fitness
equals or exceeds the fitness of contending strangers. While there
may be little reason to question the justice or wisdom of most custody
decisions, it seems fair to conclude that most courts have been
hindered rather than helped in their efforts to balance conflicting
rights and interests by adherence to the rigid and constricting maxim
One gains perspective by recalling that families are ordinarily allowed to func-
tion without outside interference though their wisdom in the upbringing of
children may vary as widely as the physical heritage or economic advantages
they give their children. Unless the upbringing of the child is so defective as
to call for action by the juvenile court, it is unlikely that an outsider will chal-
lenge the parental custody or seek by legal process to prove that the child's
welfare would best be served elsewhere.
Cory v. Cory, 70 Cal. App. 2d 563, 569-70, 161 P.2d 385, 389 (1945). In a custody
suit to determine fitness of a mother who was a member of Jehovah's Witnesses, the
court reasoned: "If it is right to take these children from their mother's custody for
the reasons stated, then by the same course of reasoning we must conclude that it would
be right and proper to deprive all Jehovah's Witnesses of custody of their off-
spring .... "
39 See 29 So. CAL. L. Rav. 96, 97 (1954). A modest attempt to tighten the Cali-
fornia fitness standard was made in Guardianship of Newell, 187 Cal. App. 2d 425, 10
Cal. Rptr. 29 (1960), by suggesting that the "best interest of the child may be considered
as bearing on the question of fitness." In support of this position, the court cited In re
Guardianship of Smith, 147 Cal. App. 2d 686, 696, 306 P.2d 86, 93 (1956) (see
quotation from case note 30 supra), in which the court allowed itself, apparently with
some misgivings, to declare unfit a mother whose "past conduct was far below society's
moral norm" and who, in addition, had been romantically involved with her husband's
murderer both before and after the killing. Id. at 702-03, 306 P.2d at 97-98.
[Vol. 4
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that in custody actions, the "best interests of the child must be para-
mount.140
VERONICA A. ROESER
40 Comment, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 306, 311-12 (1945) points to several jurisdictions in
which the paramount rights of parents to custody can, as in California, be forfeited only
by a finding that the parent is unfit or has abandoned his child, despite statutory "best
interests" requirements. While a majority of these jurisdictions have continued to up-
hold the paramount rights of fit parents with little apparent discomfiture, the Illinois
Supreme Court has concluded, in People ex rel. Pace v. Wood, 50 Ill. App. 2d 63, 68,
200 N.E.2d 125, 127 (1964), that despite a parent's superior right, "it is not necessary
that the natural parent be found unfit in order to award custody of his child to a third
party."
Ernst v. Flynn, 373 Mich. 337, 129 N.W.2d 430 (1964), presents a fascinating
study of a court's struggle with the conflicting principles of parental rights and a child's
best interests. Justice Black, in a supplemental opinion, voiced a frustration one might
expect to find expressed in many jurisdictions when he complained that: "[W]e do
have 'two irreconcilable lines of cases'-pure shuttlecock law that is-for whimsical
application to child custody controversies." Id. at 354, 129 N.W.2d at 439. An alter-
native, though seemingly quite undesirable solution to the dilemma, would be simply
to deny that a problem exists by holding that "the question is not the 'rights' of the
person claiming custody, for there are no such rights; the question is rather the wel-
fare of the child." (Emphasis added.) 2 INID. L.J. 325, 329 (1927).
